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Abstract
Using village data from Tanzania, we test whether gifts and loans between households
are voluntary while correcting for mis-reporting by the giving and receiving households.
Two maintained assumptions underlie our analysis: answers to a question on who people
would turn to for help are good proxies for willingness to link; and, conditional on regres-
sors, the probability of reporting a gift or loan is independent between giving and receiving
households. Building on these assumptions, we develop a new estimation methodology
that corrects for response bias. Our testing strategy is based on the idea that, if lending
and gift giving are voluntary, then both households should want to rely on each other for
help. We find only weak evidence to support bilateral link formation. We do, however,
find reasonably strong evidence to support unilateral link formation. Results suggest that
if a household wishes to enter in a reciprocal relationship with someone who is sufficiently
close socially and geographically, it can do so unilaterally.
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1 Introduction
Much social network analysis is based on dyadic data reported by survey respondents (e.g.,
Christakis and Fowler 2009, Steglich, Snijders, and Pearson 2010, Fafchamps and Lund 2003).
It is common for such data to be discordant. For instance, when asked to list their friends, it
often arises that, say, i lists j as a friend but the reverse is not true. Similarly, i may report
giving something to j while j does not report receiving anything from i.
Researchers typically ignore this issue even though it affects estimation and inference. To
see why, consider the following example. Suppose that half of those who give report giving
while a third of those who receive report receiving. Further assume that reporting errors are
uncorrelated between giver and receiver. This means that answers agree in one sixth of the
observations; the rest are discordant. Finally, suppose – as many researchers do – that a gift
is assumed to have taken place if it is reported either by the giver or the receiver. With these
assumptions, the actual number of gifts is underestimated by one third.1
Inference may further be biased if factors that affect giving differently affect non-response.
For instance, imagine that the old and the young give to each other equally but the old are
more likely to report than the young. The combined data will erroneously suggest that the
old are more likely to give to the young than the opposite.
This paper proposes a methodology to deal with such mis-reporting. This methodology
can be extended to other types of response bias. The theoretical literature on networks
has emphasized the role that one-sided or two-sided link formation have on the equilibrium
topology of social networks (Goyal 2007, Jackson 2009). Using our methodology to explicitly
recognize the possibility of mis-reporting, we test whether transfers (i.e. loans and gifts)
between households are more consistent with unilateral or bilateral link formation.
Two maintained assumptions underlie our analysis. The first is that answers to a first-
round question on who people would turn to for help are good proxies for willingness to link.
After examining these answers in detail, Comola and Fafchamps (2009) indeed conclude that
they are best interpreted as self-censored willingness to link. We provide additional evidence
here that it is a reasonable assumption. The second maintained hypothesis is that reporting
propensities are independent between giving and receiving households. This assumption only
enters into the construction of the maximum likelihood estimator that explicitly corrects for
under-reporting; it does not affect simpler regression analysis that we also conduct.
Our testing strategy is based on the idea that, if lending and gift giving are a voluntary
agreement between two households, then both households should want to rely on each other
for help. In contrast, if households cannot refuse to assist others, then gifts and loans are best
seen as a unilateral process. Results provide only weak support for bilateral link formation.
1Relative to the actual number of gifts, the observed number of gifts is equal to 1/2 (reported by givers)
+1/3 (reported by receivers)-1/6 (reported by both) = 2/3.
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We do, however, find evidence that is in agreement with the unilateral link formation hypoth-
esis. These findings suggest that surveyed households probably find it difficult to extricate
themselves from social and familial obligations to assists others in need. This stands in con-
trast with much of the economic literature on risk sharing which emphasizes self-interest and
reciprocal obligations (Coate and Ravallion 1993, Ligon, Thomas and Worrall 2001).
2 Conceptual framework
We first introduce the conceptual framework that underlies our test of bilateral versus uni-
lateral link formation. We then explain how we correct for the possibility of response bias.
2.1 Bilateral versus unilateral link formation
Consider a risk sharing network. A transfer from households i to household j is denoted τij .
Because transfers partly respond to shocks affecting i and j, they need not be observed over
a fixed time interval even if a sharing link exists between i and j. We also have measures
of households’ willingness to share risk with the partner, wij and wji. These measures are
dichotomous, with wij = {0, 1} and wji = {0, 1}.
If risk sharing is unilateral, transfers are more likely to take place between i and j whenever
either of them wishes to link. In this case the likelihood of observing transfers τij increase
in both wij and wji. If risk sharing is bilateral, transfers will only take place if both i and j
wish to link, that is, if wijwji = 1. Once we control for wijwji, variables wij and wji should
have no additional effect on the probability of a transfer.
This suggests the following testing strategy. Estimate a regression model of the form:
τij = λ(αwij + βwji + γwijwji + θXij) (1)
where Xij is a vector of controls and λ is the logit function. If risk sharing is unilateral, the
likelihood of transfer is the same whether {wij , wji} = {1, 0}, {0, 1}, or {1, 1}. It follows that:
α = β = α+ β + γ > 0
which implies that γ = −β = −α. If risk sharing is bilateral, transfers arise only if
{wij , wji} = {1, 1}. It follows that α = β = 0 and γ > 0. Our objective is to estimate
the regression model (1).
An alternative test can be constructed using the reverse of model (1). The usefulness of
this alternative test will become clear once we introduce response bias. Let hij = 1 if τij = 0,
i.e., hij is an indicator variable that takes value 1 is i does not give something to j. Similarly
define uij = 1− wij , i’s unwillingness to link with j.
3
In the unilateral model of link formation, hij = 1 if both i and j are unwilling to link,
i.e., if {uij , uji} = {1, 1}. In contrast, in a bilateral model of link formation, hij = 1 if either
i or j are unwilling to link, i.e., if {uij , uji} = {1, 0}, {0, 1}, or {1, 1}. Estimate a model of
the form:
hij = λ(α′uij + β′uji + γ′uijuji + θ′Xij) (2)
If risk sharing is unilateral, transfers do not take place only if {uij , uji} = {1, 1}. It follows
that α′ = β′ = 0 and γ′ > 0. In contrast, if risk sharing is bilateral, we have γ′ = −β′ =
−α′ < 0.
2.2 Response bias
In our data, both i and j were asked about transfers (i.e. loans and gifts) between them.
In principle, i and j should report the same transfers τij . This is not, however, what we
observe: where one side reports τij > 0, the other typically reports τij = 0. We have no
reason to suspect that respondents report transfers that did not take place.2 It follows that
discrepancies between reports made by i and j must be due to under-reporting.
Dropping the ij subscripts to improve readability, let τ denote the true transfer from i
to j, i.e., τ = 1 if i made a transfer to j. Further let G be the report that the giver i made
on this transfer and let R be the report that the receiver j made on the same transfer. We
have G = 1 if i reported making a transfer and 0 otherwise. Similarly, R = 1 if j reported
receiving a transfer, and 0 otherwise. We do not observe τ , only G and R. We assume no
over-reporting, which implies that G = 1 only if τ = 1, and that R = 1 only if τ = 1.
Given these assumptions, the data generation process takes the following form:
Pr(G = 1, R = 0) = Pr(τ = 1, G = 1, R = 0)
= Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R = 0|G = 1, τ = 1)
Pr(G = 0, R = 1) = Pr(τ = 1, G = 0, R = 1)
= Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(G = 0|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R = 1|G = 0, τ = 1)
Pr(G = 1, R = 1) = Pr(τ = 1, G = 1, R = 1)
= Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R = 1|G = 1, τ = 1)
Pr(G = 0, R = 0) = 1− Pr(G = 1, R = 0)− Pr(G = 0, R = 1)− Pr(G = 1, R = 1)
If we further assume that under-reporting by i is independent of under-reporting by j,
Pr(R|G, τ) = Pr(R|τ). This assumption, which is required for identification, is reasonable if
2The main reason is that reporting to an enumerator that a transfer has taken place takes time and effort
while not reporting it does not. Wrongly reporting a transfer that did not take place requires effort but does
not generate any benefit, given that all enumerators are external to the village.
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under-reporting results primarily from reporting mistakes and omissions. With this assump-
tion, we can rewrite the system as:
Pr(G = 1, R = 0) = Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R = 0|τ = 1) (3)
Pr(G = 0, R = 1) = Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(G = 0|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R = 1|τ = 1) (4)
Pr(G = 1, R = 1) = Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R = 1|τ = 1) (5)
Pr(G = 0, R = 0) = 1− Pr(G = 1, R = 0)− Pr(G = 0, R = 1)− Pr(G = 1, R = 1) (6)
Equations (3) to (6) express the data generating process in terms of three probabilities:
P (τ = 1), P (G = 1|τ = 1) and P (R = 1|τ = 1). We assume that these three probabilities
can be represented by three distinct logit functions λ(.) as follows:
Pr(τ = 1) = λT (βτXτ ) (7)
Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) = λG(βGXG) (8)
Pr(R = 1|τ = 1) = λR(βRXR) (9)
Together with (3) to (6), equations (7) to (9) fully characterize the likelihood of observing
the data. The main equation of interest is λT (βτXτ ) which corresponds to equation (1):
it is on this equation that we wish to test the restrictions imposed by our testing strategy.
Conditioning on XG and XR in Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) and Pr(R = 1|τ = 1) allows for correlation
on observables in reporting probabilities between the giving and receiving households.
In the literature to date, response bias has typically been ignored and estimation has
proceeded using transfers τij reported by i, j, or a combination of the two. For instance,
Fafchamps and Lund (2003) and De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2009) use transfers information
obtained from one of the two households only – i for transfers given, and j for transfers
received. Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) combine answers given by i and j to construct a
unique measure of τij . Whether or not response bias affects inference probably depends on
the hypothesis being tested.
Our ultimate objective is to test whether gifts and loans are unilateral or bilateral. Hence
we are primarily interested in the coefficients of wij , wji and wijwji in equation (7). We
expect the propensity to report a gift to vary systematically with wij and wji. For instance,
i may be more likely to report gifts to households from whom he wishes to seek help in the
future, i.e., households for which wij = 1. Similarly, j may be more likely to report gifts
received from households for which wji = 1.
To investigate whether response bias may affect inference regarding the coefficients of
wij , wji and wijwji in equation (7), we conduct a simulation analysis of the data generating
process defined by equations (3) to (9) under different assumptions regarding response bias
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and link formation. Results, not shown here to save space, show that response bias can
dramatically affect inference regarding wij , wji and wijwji.
If we observe the actual gifts τij without reporting bias, equation (1) can be estimated
directly. Results are as anticipated: if link formation is bilateral, α = β = 0 while γ > 0; if
link formation is unilateral, γ = −β = −α holds. If we do not observe the actual gifts τij , we
can choose to ignore reporting bias and estimate equation (1) by assuming that a transfer
took place if either i or j reported it. Simulation results indicate that, in this case, coefficient
estimates (1) are reasonable if the reporting bias does not depend on willingness to link wij
and wji. However, if it does, they are severely biased.3
Next we estimate equation (1) by maximum likelihood using the likelihood function de-
fined by equations (3) to (9). We first assume that response bias is present but does not
depend on wij and wji. In this case, ML estimates are consistent whether or not we include
wij in XG and wji in XR. We then assume that wij is in XG and wji is in XR. This is
equivalent to assuming that respondents are more likely to remember a transfer to (or from)
individuals with whom they wish to share mutual assistance. In this case, ML estimates are
consistent only if we include wij in XG and wji in XR. If we do not, the coefficient of wijwji
– which is essential to our testing strategy – is severely biased, often with the incorrect sign.
Based on these results, we estimate model (3) to (9) with wij in XG and wji in XR.
Simulations also show that, if response bias does not depend on willingness to link, consis-
tent ML estimates obtain even if XG and XR only contain an intercept term. This indicates
that identification does not require that XG and XR contain a variable that does not enter
Xτ .
2.3 Reverse model
In order to estimate model (3) to (9), we had to assume that if a transfer is reported by either
i or j, it necessarily took place. This assumption was critical to identify model (3) to (9)
from the observed data. We want to know whether our inference regarding unilateral versus
bilateral link formation is sensitive to this assumption. In particular, we want to investigate
whether test results change when we assume that all discordant answers are due to over-
reporting, i.e., to people reporting transfers that did not actually take place. This could
arise, for instance, because people wish they had made these transfers but were ashamed
to admit this to enumerators, and so made up some numbers. Whether or not this is a
reasonable assumption depends on the context. In the context of our data, we feel that this
is unlikely. But we still wish to investigate the robustness of our results to this assumption.
3We also estimated equation (1) assuming that a transfer took place if both i and j report it. In this case,
results are inconsistent irrespective of the form of response bias. This is hardly surprising given the assumed
data generation process precludes over-reporting.
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Formally, we now wish to assume that unless both i and j declare a transfer, it did not
take place. As before, we assume that response errors are independent between i and j, an
assumption that is required for identification. We have:
Pr(G = 1, R = 0) = Pr(τ = 0) ∗ Pr(G = 1|τ = 0) ∗ Pr(R = 0|τ = 0) (10)
Pr(G = 0, R = 1) = Pr(τ = 0) ∗ Pr(G = 0|τ = 0) ∗ Pr(R = 1|τ = 0) (11)
Pr(G = 0, R = 0) = Pr(τ = 0) ∗ Pr(G = 0|τ = 0) ∗ Pr(R = 0|τ = 0) (12)
Pr(G = 1, R = 1) = 1− Pr(G = 1, R = 0)− Pr(G = 0, R = 1)− Pr(G = 0, R = 0) (13)
Equations (3) to (6) express the data generating process in terms of three probabilities:
P (τ = 0), P (G = 1|τ = 0) and P (R = 1|τ = 0). As before, we assume that these three
probabilities can be represented by three distinct logit functions λ(.) as follows:
Pr(τ = 0) = λT (β′τXτ ) (14)
Pr(G = 1|τ = 0) = λG(β′GXG) (15)
Pr(R = 1|τ = 0) = λR(β′RXR) (16)
The main equation of interest now is Pr(τ = 0). Our objective remains to test whether
transfers are unilateral or bilateral. So we need a testing strategy in terms of τ = 0. Such a
strategy is provided by model (2) with Pr(τ = 0) = Pr(h = 1).
2.4 Standard errors
Dyadic observations such as those on τij (or hij) are typically not independent. This does
not invalidate the application of standard maximum likelihood techniques to estimate βτ , βG
and βR. But standard errors must be adjusted to correct for dyadic dependence across
observations, otherwise inference will be inconsistent.
If we had data from a sufficient number of distinct sub-populations we could cluster of
standard errors to correct for correlation across observations from the same sub-population
(Arcand and Fafchamps 2008). Unfortunately, we only have data from a single village. Given
this, we apply the formula developed by Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), using the scores in
lieu of X. This approach corrects for arbitrary correlation across all τij and τji observations
involving either i or j.
The simulation analysis reported earlier was conducted using dyadic standard errors.
Results indicate that t-values obtained via this method are a good basis for correct inference
about α, β and γ.
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3 The data
We use survey data from Nyakatoke, a village community in the Buboka Rural District
of Tanzania, at the west of Lake Victoria. The village’s main livelihood is the farming
of bananas, sweet potatoes and cassava for food, while coffee is the main cash crop. The
community is composed by 600 inhabitants, 307 of which are adults, for a total of 119
households interviewed in five regular intervals during 2000. This dataset is ideal for our
purpose because it is a census covering all 119 households in the village.4 The data include
information on households’ demographics (composition, age, religion, education), wealth and
assets (land and livestock ownership, quality of housing and durable goods), income sources
and income shocks, transfers and network relations.
In each of the 5 rounds of data collection (February to December 2000) each adult house-
hold member were asked whether they had received or given any loans or gifts.5 If they
said yes, information was collected on the name of the partner, the value of what was given
or received, whether in cash or kind. Loan repayment and gifts in labour are not included.
Aggregating at the household level across rounds, we obtain a picture of transfers of funds
between all households in the village. Aggregating across rounds should reduce discrepan-
cies in answers due to difference in interview dates across households. Aggregating at the
household level should also reduce discrepancies, e.g., if i mentioned giving to member a of
household j but member b is the one who mentions receiving a gift from household i.
For each household dyad ij we have four variables: gifts τ iij that i stated giving to j; gifts
τ jij that j stated receiving from i; gifts τ
j
ji that j declared giving to i; and gifts τ
i
ji that i stated
receiving from j. Similar data is available for loans. The literature on informal risk sharing
has noted that informal loans often serve to smooth consumption against shocks (Udry 1994)
and can be a way of reducing self-enforcement constraints (Foster and Rosenzweig 2001,
Kocherlakota 1996, Ligon and Thomas and Worrall 2001, Fafchamps 1999). In Nyakatoke,
gifts are more frequent than loans but smaller in magnitude (De Weerdt and Dercon 2006,
De Weerdt and Fafchamps 2009). This is in line with findings reported by Fafchamps and
Lund (2003) for the Philippines. Gifts in Nyakatoke have been shown to serve an insurance
purpose against health shocks (De Weerdt and Fafchamps, 2009).
There are major discrepancies between τ iij and τ
j
ij . In fact, τ
i
ij 6= τ jij in nearly all cases,
especially for loans. There are 1420 dyads (i.e., 10% of the dyads) for which τ iij or τ
j
ij is not
zero for gifts. Of those, in 42% of cases the report comes from the giver only, in 30% from
the receiver only, and in 27% from both. For inter-household loans, there are 545 dyads (i.e.,
4Everyone in the village agreed to participate in the survey, but there are some missing data for 4 households.
5We do not have loan and gift information at the individual level. When aggregating at the household
level, questionnaires were carefully checked by survey supervisors to avoid any double-counting of identical
gifts reported by two different members of the same household.
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4% of the dyads) for which either i or j reports a loan from i to j. In 56% of these cases, the
report comes from the giver only, in 36% from the receiver only, and in 8% from both. Out
of 378 dyads in which both i and j report a gift from i to j, only 22 report the same amount.
For loans, the corresponding number is 5 out of 37. When the amounts declared differ, they
differ by a large margin: the highest of the two declared amounts is on average double the
smallest one. This is true for both loans and gifts. The frequency distribution of loan and
gift amounts is given in Table A1 in Appendix.
We also checked whether discrepancies may be due to the fact that respondents mix up
loans and gifts. The within-dyad correlation between the difference in reported loans and the
difference in reported gifts is indeed negative, as would be the case if, say, i reports giving a
loan while j reports receiving a gift. But the correlation is small and not statistically signif-
icant: if we restrict the sample to the dyads for which at least one loan or gift was declared,
the correlation between the difference in reported loans and the difference in reported gifts
is -0.036 with a significance level of 0.13.
To summarize, there are massive discrepancies between the responses given by i and j
about the same gifts and loans τij . These discrepancies are mostly due to the fact that in the
the large majority of cases – 93% of the cases for loans and 73% of the cases for gifts – one
side reports something while the other reports nothing. Under-reporting by those who receive
gifts and loans may not be too surprising: they may have a strategic motive in ‘forgetting’
the favors they probably have a moral obligation to reciprocate. But we also observe massive
under-reporting by those who give. Consequently there may be many transfers which took
place but are not observed in the data because they were not mentioned by either sides.
When estimating model (2), our main challenge is to address this bias.
3.1 Variables definition
Our unit of observation is the dyad: in Nyakatoke there are 119 households, which gives
119 ∗ 118 = 14042 possible dyads. We organize the data such that the first listed household
refers to the giver and the second to the receiver, i.e., τij refers to a transfer from i to j. Note
that τij defines a directed network: τij represents the transfer from i to j, while τji represents
the transfer from j to i. For τij we have two different measurements: the information provided
by the giver τ iij , and the information provided by the receiver τ
j
ij . Similarly for τji.
From equation (1) our main regressors of interest are wij , wji and wijwji. In the first
Nyakatoke survey round (February 2000), each adult household member was asked: “Can you
give a list of people from inside or outside of Nyakatoke, who you can personally rely on for
help and/or that can rely on you for help in cash, kind or labor?” Answers to this question,
aggregated at the household level, are used a proxies for wij and wji. This requires some
explanation given that the question in principle asks about existing links – not willingness to
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link. We first note that if responses perfectly captured actual links, then we would observe
wij = wji for all i and j. This is not the case: out of 14042 possible dyads, there are 980
dyads for which wij or wji is not 0. Of those, only 280 have wij = wji = 1 while 700 dyads
have wij = 1 but wji = 0 or the reverse.
There remains the possibility that wij and wji are about actual links but contain a lot
of mis-reporting. Comola and Fafchamps (2009) examine this issue in detail using the same
data. They test whether wij and wji are best viewed as willingness to link or as misreported
links. They find that the data are best interpreted as willingness to link. Identification is
achieved by noting that, if wij and wji measure willingness to link, i lists nodes j that are
attractive to i irrespective of whether i is attractive to j. In contrast, if wij and wji are two
statements about the same actual link, i should take into account i’s own attractiveness to j
when answering the question.
We implement a simplified version of their test as follows. Let zj be a characteristic of j
correlated with i’s willingness to link with j, and similarly for zi. Stack observations on wij
and wji and regress them on zi and zj in a probit regression of the form wij = azi + bzj +uij
and wji = azj + bzi + uji. Consider what happens if wij and wji are measurements of actual
links and link formation is bilateral, but i and j sometimes forget to report existing links.6 In
this case, wij should be 1 only when i knows j wants to link with him. Similarly, wji should
only be 1 when j knows that i wants to link with him. Since both wij and wji enter the
regression, on average we should have a ≈ b. A similar prediction arises when link formation
is unilateral: i should report a link whenever i OR j wishes to link – and thus the likelihood
of reporting a link wij should rise with both the attractiveness of i and that of j. It is also
conceivable that i only mentions those links that he cares about, and j likewise. When this
happens, wij is increasing in the attractiveness of j for i, but not in i’s attractiveness to j,
i.e., b > 0 but a = 0. It this case, wij proxies for i’s willingness to link with j, not for a link
between i and j.
As predictors of attractiveness zj we use wealth and popularity: wealthier households
are in a better position to assist others in need; and popularity proxies for other attributes
correlated with attractiveness. Regression results are reported in Appendix Table A2.7 We
find b > 0 – the wealth and popularity of the partner are strong predictors of wij – but
a = 0 – own characteristics are not significant. These results confirm that wij and wji can
reasonably be regarded as proxying for willingness to link.
Turning to other regressors, the main regression of interest Pr(τ = 1) = λT (βτXτ ) seeks to
6A similar reasoning applies if respondents over-report links, i.e., report links that do not exist but that
they wish existed.
7Wealth is computed as the total value of land and livestock assets in Tanzanian shilling (1 unit = 100000
tzs). Popularity of household j is defined as the number of times j is listed by households other than i in
response to the risk sharing question.
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explain the transfers that are made. The regressors entering Xτ are control variables expected
to influence the actual flows of funds between households. Since τij is directional, regressors
for observation ij can differ from regressors for observation ji; this stands in contrast with
undirected network data where regressors by construction have to be identical. We expect
flows of funds between households to depend on the wealth of the giver and receiver, which
we control for. From the work of Fafchamps and Lund (2003), De Weerdt and Dercon (2006)
and De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2009), we suspect risk sharing to be more frequent among
households that are geographically and socially proximate. Finally, larger households have
more individuals involved in giving and receiving transfers. We therefore control for the
wealth of i and j, the number of adult members for i and j, the distance between the two
houses, and dummies for whether i and j are related, and share the same religion.
Next we discuss the variables that enter Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) = λG(βGXG) and Pr(R = 1|τ =
1) = λR(βRXR). The first measures the propensity for the giver to report a transfer that
has taken place; the second measures the receiver’s propensity to report a transfer that has
taken place. As discussed earlier, we include wij in XG – givers are more likely to remember
transfers to individuals whose name they listed in response to first-round interviews. We
include wji in XR for the same reason. We also include as regressors the own wealth (wealth
of i in XG and wealth of j in XG) as wealthy people are more likely to forget a transfer.
Social and geographical proximity variables are also included because respondents are more
likely to remember transfers to and from proximate households.
We also include regressors that can be expected to affect response bias but not transfers
themselves.8 For XG, we use ni ≡
∑
j wij , that is, the number of individuals listed in response
to the first-round question on who respondents would turn for help – to whom they would
provide help. The logic underneath this choice is that households intending to seek help from
(or provide help to) many other households may be more sensitive to the issue, and therefore
recall transfers better. For XR we include the number of male and female adult dependents.
The idea is that adult dependents who have received transfers from other households may
not have reported them to the household head – and therefore may be reluctant to report
them to enumerators.
To illustrate whether our correction for mis-reporting affects inference regarding the link
formation process, we also estimate two probit regressions which are by construction directly
comparable with Pr(τ = 1). In the first of them, the dependent variable equals one if at
least one side has declared a gift. This is equivalent to defining τuij ≡ max{τ iij , τ jij}. This
assumes that mis-reporting only takes the form of under-reporting. In the second regression
the dependent variable equals one if both the giver and the receiver have declared a gift, i.e.,
it is τ oij ≡ min{τ iij , τ jij}, which is equivalent to assuming that mis-reporting takes the form of
8Simulation analysis reported earlier indicates that ML estimates are reliable even without identifying
instruments, so including these variables is not necessary for identification.
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over-reporting.
In Table 1 we present summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis. The upper
section of the table reports different ‘versions’ of the dependent variable. The first two rows
focus on the gifts from i to j, as reported by i and j. Variables τ iij takes value 1 if i reported
a gift to j, and 0 otherwise. Similarly for τ jij . We see that givers are more likely to report a
gift than receivers. In the next two rows we report τuij ≡ max{τ iij , τ jij} and τ oij ≡ min{τ iij , τ jij}.
They demonstrate the extent of the divergence between the information given by households
i and j on the same reality τij .
In the next four rows we report the same information for inter-household loans. Variables
are constructed in the same way. Here too we see that lenders are more likely to report a
loan than borrowers, and that there are considerable discrepancies between loans reported
given and loans reported received.
From these figures it is possible to compute a rough estimate of extent of under-reporting,
assuming independence in reporting probability between i and j. We focus on gifts first.
We wish to estimate three unconditional probabilities: Pr(τ = 1), Pr(G = 1|τ = 1), and
Pr(R = 0|τ = 1). We have three equations to do so:
Pr(G = 1, R = 0) = Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R = 0|τ = 1) = 0.043 (17)
Pr(G = 0, R = 1) = Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(G = 0|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R = 1|τ = 1) = 0.031 (18)
Pr(G = 1, R = 1) = Pr(τ = 1) ∗ Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) ∗ Pr(R = 1|τ = 1) = 0.028 (19)
Simple algebra yields the following solution:
Pr(τ = 1) = 15%
Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) = 47%
Pr(R = 1|τ = 1) = 39%
The above calculation shows that there is considerable under-reporting of gifts and that
τuij = 10.1% underestimates the frequency of gifts by almost 50%. A similar calculation for
loans yields:
Pr(τ = 1) = 14%
Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) = 18%
Pr(R = 1|τ = 1) = 12%
which suggests massive under-reporting of loans and indicates that τuij = 3.9% only captures
a quarter of the loans we suspect were made.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics (N=14042)
variable mean min max sd
τ iij (gifts) 0.071
τ jij (gifts) 0.059
τuij (gifts) 0.101
τ oij (gifts) 0.028
τ iij (loans) 0.025
τ jij (loans) 0.017
τuij (loans) 0.039
τ oij (loans) 0.003
wij and wji 0.045
wijwji 0.020
weighted wij and weighted wji 0.023 0 0.933 0.117
wealthi and wealthj 4.546 0 27.970 4.815
same religion 0.354
related 0.016
distance 0.522 0.014 1.738 0.303
hhmembersi and hhmembersj 2.555 1 9 1.314
ni 5.294 0 19 3.063
female dependentsj 1.101 0 6 0.864
male dependentsj 0.437 0 3 0.729
The rest of the table focuses on regressors. Variable wij = 1 if someone in household i
mentioned someone in household j in response to the first-round question on who respondents
turn for help. The product wijwji = 1 if i listed j and j listed i, something that occurs only
for 2% of the dyads.
We also report a weighted version of wij that is constructed as follows. Remember that
the first-round question on who respondents turn for help was answered separately by each
adult members of the household. For each household member l in household i, we know the
order in which they listed various individuals m from other households j. This order may
contain information on how seriously l regards m to be a possible source of assistance. To
aggregate this information at the level of the household, we construct a weighted link variable
weightlm for each lm pair. This variable is defined as:
weightlm =
(#namesl + 1)− ranklm
#namesl + 1
where #namesl is the total number of names given by l and ranklm is the order in which
m was listed by l. We then average weightlm across all l members of household i and all m
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members of household j.9
Control variables are reported next. Whenever the average is the same for giver and
receiver, we only report one of them. Wealth is computed as the total value of land and
livestock assets (1 unit = 100000 tzs). We see there is considerable variation in wealth
levels across Nyakatoke households. There is also significant diversity in religion: only 35%
of households heads share the same religion.10 Around 1.6% of household pairs are closely
related, i.e., are siblings or children-parents. Distance between households is measured in
Km and is on average 500 meters.11 Adult members are those aged 15 and above. Male and
female dependents are defined as adult members of the household who are not the head of
household. Wives are included in the dependents, the idea being that they too may seek to
dissimulate gifts and loans received from other households.
4 Estimation results
4.1 Baseline model
We now proceed to estimate equation (1). In the results presented in Table 2 transfers τij
refer to gifts from i to j, in cash or in kind. Columns (1) and (2) report simple probit
regressions where the dependent variable is τuij and τ
o
ij , respectively. These regressions are
presented as robustness checks on estimates presented in column (3). Columns (3) to (5)
of the table report coefficients obtained from estimating the likelihood function formed by
combining equations (3) to (9). Column (3) corresponds to our model of interest (1).
Results strongly reject the bilateral link formation model: both α and β are strongly
significant, while γ is never significantly positive. Coefficient estimates are at least partly
consistent with unilateral link formation: α and β, the coefficients of wij and wji, are both
significant and of the same order of magnitude. A Wald test cannot reject the hypothesis
that α = β in column (3), with a p-value of 0.3652. This is true in the model estimates that
correct for under-reporting, but also in columns (1) and (2) where the dependent variable
is constructed in a more conventional manner. As predicted by the unilateral model the
coefficient γ of wijwji is negative in all three columns (1), (2) and (3) – but only significantly
so in column (1). Furthermore, contrary to the predictions of the unilateral link formation
model, γ 6= −β and γ 6= −α: a Wald test rejects the joint hypotheses γ+α = 0 and γ+β = 0
with p-value=0.002. This means that if wij = 1 and also wji = 1 then the probability of
transfer is larger than if either of them alone is equal to 1. In other words, when both
9Whenever l mentions someone who lives outside Nyakatoke, we take this person into account when com-
puting #namesl and rankm.
10Out of 119 households, 24 are Muslim (20%), 46 are Protestant (39%) and 49 are Catholic (41%).
11For 3 households the distance to other households is missing, so we have imputed the sample average to
avoid losing those observations.
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households list each other as someone they would go to for help, they are more likely to help
each other than if only one lists the other. This suggests that some bilateral dimension is
present, even if the results strongly reject the bilateral model itself.
Control variables have reasonable coefficients in columns (1), (2) and (3). Wealthier
households give more (and may also receive more – see column 1). People give more to
relatives, neighbors, and members of the same religious community.
Results for the two under-reporting regressions – columns (4) and (5) – show that re-
spondents are more likely to report a transfer from/to those households they have previously
mentioned.
In the Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) regression, wij is positively significant, indicating that if household
i has listed household j in the sense that wij = 1, then i is more likely to report a gift given
to j. Variable ni, which is the total number of individuals listed in response of the first-round
question, is significantly positive, suggesting that large households are more likely to report
gifts given. Also, own wealth is significant and negative: wealthy respondents are more likely
to forget reporting the gifts they have made. Analogously, in the Pr(R = 1|τ = 1) regression
wji is positively significant, and wealthj is negatively significant. The numbers of female and
male dependents have the anticipated negative sign, but they are not significant.
To get a sense of the magnitude of the under-reporting effects, we calculate marginal
effects for the Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) and Pr(R = 1|τ = 1) regressions. Results, reported in Table
A3 in appendix, confirm that wij and wji have quantitatively the largest effect on reporting
bias. Relatedness and geographical distance also have effects that are large in magnitude.
In Table 3 we repeat the same analysis using loans instead of gifts. Coefficient estimates
reported in columns (1) and (3) more or less satisfy α = β = −γ , a finding that is consistent
with the unilateral model. A Wald test of the joint hypothesis that α = β = −γ has p-
value of 0.9303, implying that we cannot reject the hypothesis of unilateral link formation.
But these coefficients are only statistically significant in column (1). This may be because
the proportion of non-zero observations is smaller for loans, making ML estimation more
difficult. In terms of the other regressors, few of them are significant, a point already noted
by De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2009) in the same dataset. In column (3), we find wealthi
(marginally) significant, reconfirming the intuition that wealthy households are those who
lend money. In the Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) regression only ni is significantly positive, and in the
Pr(R = 1|τ = 1) regression only the previously declared willingness to link wji is significantly
positive. Marginal effects reported in Table A2 show that the variables with the largest
impact are wij (which is not significant) and ni for the giver and wji for the receiver.
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Table 2. Results for gifts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τuij τ
o
ij Pr(τ = 1) Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) Pr(R = 1|τ = 1)
wij 1.401*** 1.129*** 2.563*** 1.492***
(0.107) (0.116) (0.371) (0.180)
wji 1.582*** 1.521*** 2.817*** 1.920***
(0.093) (0.109) (0.305) (0.227)
wijwji -0.417** -0.235 -0.196
(0.194) (0.165) (0.980)
wealthi 0.029*** 0.013* 0.081*** -0.035**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.016) (0.016)
wealthj 0.035** 0.000 0.105 -0.045***
(0.018) (0.012) (0.066) (0.015)
same religion 0.221*** 0.174** 0.530** 0.025 0.012
(0.052) (0.068) (0.251) (0.211) (0.196)
related 0.942*** 0.583*** 1.961** 0.433 0.614
(0.173) (0.189) (0.762) (0.505) (0.377)
distance -0.829*** -0.892*** -1.678** -0.585 -0.533
(0.186) (0.317) (0.660) (0.536) (0.485)
hhmembersi 0.047*** 0.038 0.110**
(0.018) (0.028) (0.043)
hhmembersj 0.108** 0.082* 0.262
(0.054) (0.044) (0.168)
ni 0.026*
(0.013)
female dependentsj -0.149
(0.143)
male dependentsj -0.191
(0.133)
constant -2.016*** -2.511*** -3.525*** -0.277 -0.209
(0.156) (0.191) (0.540) (0.590) (0.359)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dyadic-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3. Results for loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τuij τ
o
ij Pr(τ = 1) Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) Pr(R = 1|τ = 1)
wij 0.969*** 0.464 2.639 0.570
(0.112) (0.413) (5.599) (0.624)
wji 1.006*** 1.169*** 2.536 1.206**
(0.106) (0.191) (6.437) (0.558)
wijwji -0.750*** -0.195 -2.021
(0.116) (0.421) (8.388)
wealthi 0.010 -0.005 0.061* -0.041
(0.009) (0.013) (0.036) (0.051)
wealthj 0.008 0.006 0.031 -0.012
(0.006) (0.006) (0.051) (0.031)
same religion 0.080 -0.082 0.323 -0.058 -0.041
(0.055) (0.219) (2.717) (1.601) (1.048)
related 0.107 -0.100 0.681 -0.079 0.133
(0.170) (0.376) (18.080) (1.946) (1.760)
distance -0.576*** -0.471** -1.775 -0.083 0.020
(0.125) (0.231) (1.282) (1.608) (1.191)
hhmembersi 0.023 0.028 0.013
(0.040) (0.048) (0.270)
hhmembersj 0.021 0.018 0.192
(0.026) (0.055) (0.635)
ni 0.113**
(0.047)
female dependentsj -0.047
(0.168)
male dependentsj -0.222
(0.157)
constant -1.915*** -2.969*** -1.991 -2.478 -2.442*
(0.136) (0.223) (2.032) (2.208) (1.409)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dyadic-robust standard errors in parentheses.
4.2 Reverse model
Next we estimate the reverse model, which assumes that all discordant answers are due to
over-reporting. The testing strategy and likelihood function corresponding to this assumption
were presented in Section 2. It should be noted that, in our data, only 10% of household pairs
both declare a gift and only 3% both declare a loan. This means that, under the assumption
of no under-reporting, the number of loan observations for which τ = 1 is small, making
inference more difficult and possibly creating identification and convergence problems. It is
nevertheless instructive to investigate whether we obtain results that do not contradict our
17
earlier conclusions regarding unilateral link formation.
Estimation results are presented in Table 4 for gifts and Table 5 for loans. Results are
less conclusive than those reported in Tables 2 and 3. Coefficients α′ and β′ are significantly
positive in all three gift regressions (Table 4), that is, for the two logit models and for the ML
model that corrects for response bias. In the loan regressions (Table 5), α′ and β′ are positive
in all three regressions, although only significantly so in the logit regressions. As explained
in section 2 when discussing equation (2), this evidence is consistent with the unilateral link
formation hypothesis. However, γ′, the coefficient of (1 − wij)(1 − wji), is also positive and
significant in several of the regressions, which is consistent with bilateral link formation.
Hence, when we assume that there is no under-reporting (only over-reporting), the evidence
is ambiguous in the sense that it supports both models – or a hybrid of the two, where links
are formed in a way that is largely unilateral but contains some bilateral element as well.
Regarding the reporting equations, we find, as before, that the likelihood of reporting
a gift increases in wij and wji. It also increases significantly with kinship, geographical
proximity, and co-religion. For loans (Table 5), results show that the likelihood of reporting
a loan increases with wij and wij and with geographical proximity.
4.3 Robustness analysis
To further investigate the robustness of our results, we reestimate ML model (3) to (6) omit-
ting wij and wji from the response bias equations. Results, not shown here to save space, are
dramatically different from those reported in Tables 2 and 3. In particular, the coefficient of
wijwji in the Pr(τ = 1) equation becomes large and positive, and has a large t-value. Virtu-
ally identical results for Pr(τ = 1) are obtained if the Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) and Pr(R = 1|τ = 1)
only include an intercept (see Table A4 in Appendix). On the other side, if we only include
wij and wji and the constant in the response bias equations, results are very close to those
reported in Tables 2 and 3. These findings are consistent with the simulation results reported
in Section 2. They confirm that correct inference requires that we include wij and wji in the
response bias equations, as done in Tables 2 and 3.
We worry that what household i reported as a gift was reported as a loan by j. Misclas-
sification would affect estimated reporting propensities and hence may affect inference. To
investigate whether misclassification may have affected our results, we reestimate the baseline
model using combined gifts and loans as the dependent variable. Results, shown in Table A5
in Appendix, are very similar to those reported in Table 2 for gifts. Misclassification there-
fore does not seem to explain our results. In the reporting equation for transfer recipients,
the number of male dependents is negative and significant at the 10% level. This provides
some support to the idea that under-reporting of gifts received is to avoid detection by other
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household members – a point already made by Anderson and Baland (2002) in their study
of spouses’ saving behavior.
Next, we repeat the analysis adding the weighted version of wij and wji as additional
regressors in the reporting equations. Everything else is unchanged. Results, reported in
Table 6 for gifts and Table 7 for loans, are very similar to those reported in Tables 2 and 3,
and the new variables are not significant, with the exception of weighted wij for gifts.
We have also re-estimated the model with different sets of regressors. Convergence is
generally smooth for a moderately sized set of regressors as the ones of Table 2 and 3, and
estimated coefficients for the key regressors (as self-declared links, and relational attributes)
are similar across specifications. A few regressors in columns (4) and (5) are sufficient to
get stable estimates for Pr(τ = 1). However, identification gets more problematic if we
include partner’s characteristic in the response bias equations (i.e., j’s characteristics in
Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) and i’s characteristics in Pr(R = 1|τ = 1)). The results presented here
should thus be interpreted as based on these exclusion assumptions.
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Table 6. Results for gifts with weighted wij
(1) (2) (3)
Pr(τ = 1) Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) Pr(R = 1|τ = 1)
wij 2.578*** 1.081***
(0.376) (0.278)
wji 2.817*** 1.819***
(0.306) (0.324)
wijwji -0.218
(0.987)
wealthi 0.081*** -0.035**
(0.016) (0.016)
wealthj 0.105 -0.044***
(0.067) (0.015)
same religion 0.533** 0.024 0.010
(0.251) (0.212) (0.194)
related 2.002*** 0.415 0.597
(0.776) (0.504) (0.379)
distance -1.675** -0.585 -0.537
(0.668) (0.547) (0.490)
hhmembersi 0.109**
(0.043)
hhmembersj 0.261
(0.169)
ni 0.027**
(0.013)
weighted wij 0.796*
(0.435)
female dependentsj -0.150
(0.143)
male dependentsj -0.189
(0.133)
weighted wji 0.200
(0.472)
constant -3.526*** -0.283 -0.209
(0.542) (0.597) (0.360)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dyadic-robust standard errors
in parentheses.
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Table 7. Results for loans with weighted wij
(1) (2) (3)
Pr(τ = 1) Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) Pr(R = 1|τ = 1)
wij 2.639 0.483
(5.653) (0.548)
wji 2.531 1.260**
(6.476) (0.598)
wijwji -2.027
(8.449)
wealthi 0.061* -0.041
(0.037) (0.051)
wealthj 0.031 -0.012
(0.052) (0.031)
same religion 0.324 -0.058 -0.042
(2.742) (1.616) (1.058)
related 0.681 -0.082 0.133
(18.455) (1.978) (1.809)
distance -1.775 -0.081 0.020
(1.284) (1.619) (1.195)
hhmembersi 0.013
(0.272)
hhmembersj 0.192
(0.644)
ni 0.113**
(0.048)
weighted wij 0.171
(0.466)
female dependentsj -0.047
(0.167)
male dependentsj -0.222
(0.158)
weighted wji -0.103
(0.578)
constant -1.991 -2.479 -2.439*
(2.038) (2.220) (1.418)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dyadic-robust standard errors
in parentheses.
4.4 Estimate of the under-reporting bias
A by-product of the estimation of the maximum likelihood model formed by equations (3) to
(9) is that we can estimate the extent of under-reporting. This is achieved by comparing the
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frequency of giving or lending in data to the average frequency of the fitted Pr(τ = 1) from
Tables 2 (for gifts) and 3 (for loans). The result of these calculations is reported in Table 8.
Table 8. The estimate of the bias
gifts loans
average fitted Pr(τij = 1) 0.1568 0.1942
in data: declared by i 0.0709 0.0249
in data: declared by j 0.0587 0.0169
in data: declared by i or j 0.1011 0.0388
average fitted Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) 0.3742 0.1138
average fitted Pr(R = 1|τ = 1) 0.3110 0.0729
The average fitted propensity to give from Table 2 is 15%, which is the same figure as
the one we obtained in Section 3 without conditioning on regressors. For loans, the average
fitted Pr(τij = 1) of 19% is larger than our earlier estimate of 14%. Based on these results,
informal loans between villagers are more frequent than gifts, although much fewer of them
are reported in the survey. Comparing these estimates to actually reported gifts and loans,
we see that not taking response bias into consideration leads to serious underestimation of
the extent of gift giving and, especially, of lending and borrowing between villagers.
Table 8 also reports the average fitted propensity to report giving and receiving respec-
tively. The average propensity for the giver to report a gift is 37% when we condition
reporting on individual characteristics, compared to 47% when we do not. For recipients of
a gift, the propensity to report is 31%, compared to 39% when we do not condition on indi-
vidual characteristics. Estimated reporting probabilities are much lower for loans. Lenders
are estimated to report only 11% of loans – compared to 18% when we do not condition.
Borrowers estimated to report as little as 7% of loans, versus 12% if we do not condition on
household characteristics. If anything, estimated propensities to report gifts and loans fall
when we allow them to depend on household characteristics.
The Nyakatoke data were collected with an unusually high level of care, using multiple
survey rounds and interviewing each household member separately. Yet results suggests
massive under-reporting. This casts some doubt on the reliability of reported gifts and loans
in household survey. For instance, many studies have found that reported gifts and loans
are insufficient to insulate households against shocks. But if actual gifts and loans are much
larger, these findings might be called into question.
For comparison purposes, we also report in Table 9 estimated propensities from a model
in which response equations do not include willingness to link wij as regressor. The purpose
of this calculation is to investigate the extent to which our results are sensitive to model
specification. We find that, if we omit wij and wji from the response equations, the predicted
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response rate increases for both gifts and loans, and consequently the estimated average
propensity to give or lend decreases. But the magnitudes remain similar and the results
again suggest that there is much more under-reporting in loans than in gifts.
Table 9. No wij and wij in response equations
gifts loans
average fitted Pr(τij = 1) 0.1473 0.1763
average fitted Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) 0.4608 0.1346
average fitted Pr(R = 1|τ = 1) 0.4130 0.0943
5 Discussion
We have shown that gifts and informal loans are consistent with a process of unilateral link
formation. This, however, does not say anything about the nature of the willingness to link.
In particular, do Nyakatoke villagers unilaterally decide to whom they wish to give? Or do
they unilaterally decide from whom they can demand assistance?
The question on which proxies for willingness to link wij and wji are based is a question
about an undirected link: “Can you give a list of people [...] who you can personally rely on
[...] and/or that can rely on you [...]?” We do not know whether answers to this question
capture willingness to provide help or to seek help – or both. But suppose we had separate
information on i’s willingness to give help to j and on i’s willingness to ask j for help. Then
we could test whether it is one or the other that drives the exchange of gifts and informal
loans between Nyakatoke households.
To illustrate this idea, let wgij denote i’s desire to help j and let w
r
ji denote j’s willingness
to solicit help from i. Combining this information with the available information about the
direction of transfers from i to j , we could construct a more specific test as follows: regress
transfers τij from i to j on w
g
ij and w
r
ji:
τij = λ(αw
g
ij + βw
r
ji + θXij)
If it is unilateral willingness to give that determines transfers, then we should have α > 0
and β = 0: transfers take place whenever i wishes to give something to j. This could reflect
altruism, or perhaps moral norms regarding charitable giving. In contrast, if it is unilateral
willingness to receive help that determines τij , transfers will take place whenever j wishes
to receive something from i. Consequently we should obtain α = 0 and β > 0. This could
arise, for instance, because of social norms of redistribution, the existence of which has been
argued by Hayami and Platteau (1996) for sub-Saharan Africa.12
12If j perfectly internalizes i’s altruism towards him/her, then both α and β should in principle be positive.
But since wrji = w
g
ji in this case, the w
g
ijw
r
ji cross term will capture the effect of both w
g
ij and w
r
ji on transfers
– and link formation will appear bilateral.
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We do not have separate information about willingness to give and willingness to receive.
But let us imagine for a moment that wij should in fact be interpreted as willingness to give,
i.e., wij = w
g
ij . If this were the case, then when we regress τij on wij and wji, it is like
estimating a model of the form:
τij = λ(αw
g
ij + βw
g
ji + θXij)
If transfers are unilaterally driven by the willingness to give of the giver, then we should
observe α > 0 and β = 0. This is not what we observe in Tables 2 and 3.
Alternatively, imagine that answers to the undirected question of round 1 measure will-
ingness to ask for help, i.e., wij = wrij . In this case, when we regress τij on wij and wji, it is
like estimating a model of the form:
τij = λ(αwrij + βw
r
ji + θXij)
If transfers are unilaterally driven by the recipient’s willingness to request assistance, then
we should observe α = 0 and β > 0. Once again, this is not what we observe in Tables 2 and
3.
What inference can we draw from the above? First, there is no evidence that answers to
the undirected question of round 1 should be interpreted as reflecting only willingness to give
or only willingness to receive. If this had been the case, we should not have found wij and
wji to be both significant in Tables 2 and 3 with coefficients of equal magnitude. It follows
that answers to the undirected question of round 1 were indeed undirected: they capture
both willingness to give and willingness to receive.
Secondly, we cannot a priori tell whether wij captures willingness to give and receive from
the same person – as in a reciprocal relationship – or whether some wij ’s capture willingness
to give and others capture willingness to receive. But in the latter case, both types of wij ’s
would need to be present in the data in exactly the right proportions for α and β to be of
equal magnitude. Since there is no particular reason for this to be the case, we find this
possibility unlikely. It follows that wij most probably represents willingness to enter in a
reciprocal relationship – as indeed suggested by the wording of the question.
6 Conclusion
Using detailed dyadic data from the village of Nyakatoke in Tanzania, we have tested whether
gifts and loans between resident households is best interpreted as driven by unilateral or
bilateral link formation. Two maintained assumptions underlie our analysis: answers to a
first-round question on who people would turn to for help are good proxies for willingness to
link; and reporting propensities are independent between giving and receiving households.
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The first assumption is perhaps the most contentious one, given that the first-round
question asks who respondents would turn to for help (or would provide help to), not who they
would like to turn to for help. But there is considerable discordance between answers given by
respondents, and detailed analysis by Comola and Fafchamps (2009) – and additional analysis
conducted here – indicate that answers to this question are best interpreted as willingness to
link. The second maintained assumption is also problematic, although it is weakened by the
inclusion, in the two reporting equations, of regressors that capture some of the correlation
in reporting. This assumption is only required for the estimation of the maximum likelihood
model that explicitly recognizes the existence of mis-reporting – not for the estimation of a
simpler, single-equation model.
The testing strategy itself is based on the simple observation that, if lending and gift
giving are a voluntary agreement between two households, then both households should want
to rely on each other for help. In contrast, if households can decide to form mutual assistance
links with others they wish to help – or from whom they wish to seek assistance – then gifts
and loans are best seen as a unilateral process.
We develop an estimation methodology that corrects for mis-reporting. This is essential
for our purpose because there are substantial discrepancies between gifts and loans reported
by givers and receivers. Simulation results indicate that, for the purpose of our test, ignoring
reporting bias would lead to incorrect inference. We propose a new maximum likelihood
estimator that corrects for response bias. Two versions of this estimator are developed: one
in which we assume away over-reporting, and one in which we assume away under-reporting.
In our data, it is unlikely that respondents systematically over-report the gifts and loans they
give or receive. We therefore put more weight in the results that assume that respondents
under-report gifts and loans – presumably because they forget.
When we assume that respondents under-report, we find no evidence to support bilateral
link formation. We do, however, find reasonably convincing evidence to support the unilateral
link formation hypothesis. These results are robust to different choices of model specification.
When we assume that respondents over-report gifts and loans, the evidence is less conclusive:
we still find evidence consistent with unilateral link formation, but some of the coefficient
estimates are also consistent with bilateral link formation.
Given data limitations, we cannot formally test whether it is willingness to give or will-
ingness to demand that drive transfers. But taken as a whole, the evidence is most consistent
with transfers being driven by willingness to enter in a reciprocal relationship. If this inter-
pretation is correct, the evidence of unilateral link formation that we have uncovered implies
that if one household wishes to enter in a reciprocal relationship with another household, it
can unilaterally do so – provided this other household is sufficiently close socially and geo-
graphically. This could arise, for instance, because inter-personal norms of reciprocity can
be activated unilaterally by Nyakatoke villagers – as when giving to someone is a way of
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obligating him or her to reciprocate in the future (Platteau 2000).
If confirmed by future research, the above interpretation could explain the puzzling find-
ings of Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) and those of De Weerdt and Fafchamps (2009) using
the same data. These authors find that, contrary to theoretical predictions, households do
not appear more likely to form risk sharing links with those who face less covariate risk. But
if households can wait after shocks are realized before deciding who to ask for help, they need
not worry about covariate risk ex ante.
This interpretation ties with another surprising result of our analysis, namely that loans
are less likely to be reported than gifts. It is easy to see why borrowers would fail to report
the loans they have received, but why would lenders do so? Much of the theoretical discourse
about risk sharing has emphasized repeated games and reputation sanctions (Coate and
Ravallion 1993, Kocherlakota 1996). Yet, if lenders hide the loans they make, it is hard to
see how group reputational sanctions could be imposed. There must therefore be a cost to the
lender for publicizing loans. One possible explanation is that lenders fear that disclosing loans
reveals they have money they do not need, and would attract additional requests for help. A
similar point is made by Anderson and Baland (2002) regarding secrecy within households
to avoid claims on resources by spouses. If link formation was bilateral and assistance was
voluntary, it would be possible to refuse to assist others and secrecy would not be necessary.
These issues deserve further investigation.
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Appendix
Table A1. Quintiles of declared loans and gifts
Gifts Loans
Information given by: giver receiver giver receiver
nonzero obs. 996 824 350 237
cut-off values:
0-20% 240 200 456 400
20-40% 500 450 900 700
40-60% 1000 850 1500 1532
60-80% 1796 1800 3000 3000
80-100% 39400 46800 60000 40000
Note: the total sample size is 14042 dyads, and the quintiles cut-off values are
computed on nonzero observations only. Values expressed in tzs.
Table A2. Testing whether willingness to link
dependent variable: wij
popularityi 0.013
(0.010)
wealthi 0.009
(0.007)
popularityj 0.049***
(0.004)
wealthj 0.007**
(0.003)
constant -2.151***
(0.061)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Estimator is Probit. Dyadic-robust standard errors
in parentheses.
31
Table A3. Marginal effects
Pr(G = 1|τ = 1)
gifts loans
coeff. mfx. coeff. mfx.
w∗ij 1.4917 0.5388 0.5702 0.0425
wealthi -0.0354 -0.0123 -0.0411 -0.0018
same religion∗ 0.0246 0.0086 -0.0580 -0.0025
related∗ 0.4332 0.1634 -0.0795 -0.0032
distance -0.5854 -0.2036 -0.0835 -0.0036
ni 0.0259 0.0090 0.1126 0.0049
Pr(R = 1|τ = 1)
gifts loans
coeff. mfx. coeff. mfx.
w∗ji 1.9196 0.6625 1.2059 0.0707
wealthj -0.0447 -0.0125 -0.0120 -0.0002
same religion∗ 0.0118 0.0033 -0.0409 -0.0006
related∗ 0.6136 0.2092 0.1331 0.0022
distance -0.5326 -0.1496 0.0201 0.0003
female dependentsj -0.1495 -0.0420 -0.0467 -0.0006
male dependentsj -0.1906 -0.0535 -0.2221 -0.0031
*dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
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Table A4. Constant-only model
gifts loans
Pr(τ = 1)
wij 3.222*** 2.856***
(0.396) (1.074)
wji 3.749*** 3.184**
(0.534) (1.457)
wijwji 13.490*** 10.787***
(1.037) (2.972)
wealthi 0.064*** 0.036
(0.013) (0.029)
wealthj 0.083** 0.021
(0.036) (0.017)
same religion 0.519*** 0.208
(0.120) (0.155)
blood link 2.423*** 0.950
(0.359) (0.635)
distance -2.049*** -1.799***
(0.466) (0.432)
hhmembersi 0.115*** 0.065
(0.040) (0.109)
hhmembersj 0.235* 0.106
(0.123) (0.094)
constant -3.483*** -2.270***
(0.388) (0.610)
Pr(G = 1|τ = 1)
constant 0.143 -1.528***
(0.225) (0.403)
Pr(R = 1|τ = 1)
constant -0.228* -1.986***
(0.133) (0.320)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Dyadic-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A5. Results for total transfers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
τuij τ
o
ij Pr(τ = 1) Pr(G = 1|τ = 1) Pr(R = 1|τ = 1)
wij 1.392*** 1.122*** 2.414*** 1.605***
(0.102) (0.107) (0.377) (0.212)
wji 1.565*** 1.564*** 2.793*** 1.994***
(0.093) (0.100) (0.311) (0.202)
wijwji -0.344* -0.320* 0.510
(0.188) (0.164) (2.297)
wealthi 0.026*** 0.011 0.076*** -0.039***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.012)
wealthj 0.031** 0.006 0.092* -0.035***
(0.015) (0.010) (0.052) (0.012)
same religion 0.198*** 0.170*** 0.430* 0.058 0.078
(0.052) (0.062) (0.256) (0.212) (0.182)
related 0.851*** 0.558*** 1.657** 0.527 0.708**
(0.168) (0.187) (0.680) (0.434) (0.346)
distance -0.839*** -0.937*** -1.593*** -0.667 -0.601
(0.160) (0.292) (0.607) (0.488) (0.463)
hhmembersi 0.045* 0.043* 0.100**
(0.024) (0.023) (0.049)
hhmembersj 0.109*** 0.066** 0.272**
(0.040) (0.032) (0.113)
ni 0.053***
(0.016)
female dependentsj -0.139
(0.125)
male dependentsj -0.207*
(0.123)
constant -1.796*** -2.363*** -3.022*** -0.350 -0.357
(0.143) (0.162) (0.505) (0.533) (0.333)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dyadic-robust standard errors in parentheses.
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